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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
consult counsel, beset by fears and ignorant as to the proper course
to pursue, can it be denied that the most natural thing for the
accused to do under such circumstances is to keep silent?
RUBIN BARON.
A FORWARD STEP IN LABOR REGULATION.
At the start of the present year Justice Cotillo in Special Term
of the New York County Supreme Court named three receivers to
manage the affairs of Local 306 of the Motion Picture Operators'
Union of Greater New York. This appointment came about as
the result of charges of mismanagement of the Local by its parent
organization, which was in control of the local by virtue of the
lawful exercise of the right of suspension of local officers in an
emergency.' The board was appointed by the court for a twofold
purpose: "(1) To have custody of the funds of the union and to
control its expenditures, with full recognition of its financial obli-
gations to the superior union, and (2) to supervise the rights of
individual members in their relation to the union and in the pres-
ervation of their contractual rights." 2
This decision will be welcomed by those who regret-the atti-
tude of laissez-faire which has been adopted by the New York
courts dealing with certain problems of labor.3 The essential idea
of laissez-faire consists in setting aside all interference (in theory
at least) of government and all artificial control of groups within
the state. It is not within the scope of this note to probe deeply
into the fallacies of this principle. We think the present world-wide
depression coming at the end of a period of rugged individualism
is an adequate indictment. The author is in accord with the prin-
ciples of that great Christian teacher Leo XIII,4 that:
"Laws, institutions, and administration must aim at pub-
lic well-being as well as private property rights. A just
freedom of action is only valid as long as the common good
is secured and no injustice entailed. Whenever the general
interest of any particular class suffers, or is threatened with
'Kaplan v. Elliot, 145 Misc. 863, 261 N. Y. Supp. 112 (1932).
2 These purposes were laid down in an opinion, denying a motion for reargu-
ment of the appointment, Kaplan v. Elliot, N. Y. L. J., January 5, 1933, at 57.
The original order is reported in Kaplan v. Elliot, N. Y. L. J., December 28,
1932, at 3015.
'Exchange Bakery v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927) ; Still-
well v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932); Note (1932) 7 Sr. JOHN'S
L. REv. 68.
'LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL ON THE CONDITION OF THE WORKING CLASSES(1892).
NOTES AND COMMENT
evils which cam in no other way be met, the public authority
must step in to meet them. The limits must be determined
by the nature of the occasion which calls for the law's in-
terference-the principle being this, that the law must not
undertake more, nor go further than is required for the rem-
edy of evil or the removal of the danger." 5 (Italics ours.)
Assuming in the Kaplan case 6 that the local was being mis-
managed, then this was a situation where the evils to the local could
only be prevented by the intervention of the public authority. The
members had no further remedy within their own organization,
and thus ample cause -for public intervention existed. Under our
present system of law such interference should properly come from
a court of equity.
It is true that under the English jurisdiction there could be no
receivership established.8 This is due to the peculiar position (in
the light of American ideals) which labor unions hold in that
country. The British courts, bound by the traditions of the feudal
overlords, made trade associations illegal at common law, inasmuch
as their purposes were considered to be in unreasonable restraint
of trade.9 Although such organizations were legalized by the Trade
Union -Act of 1871, the same legislation expressly forbade the courts
to enforce agreements, which are generally necessary to successful
operation of a labor association."0 The English have adopted what
'Address by Justice Edward S. Dore, delivered at Fordham University,
November 20, 1932. The Judge sets forth succinctly the ideas of the encyclical,
using many of the Pontiff's own words.
I The court, mupra notes 1 and 2, does not discuss the facts save in a very
general way. It is possible that the Appellate Division reversed the Special
Term, because there was not sufficient evidence that the local was being mis-
managed by the parent organization. Kaplan, one of the plaintiffs in petition
for the appointment of receivers, was recently convicted of coercion. The said
crime was not wholly unconnected with the local's activities.
Supra notes 1 and 2.
s "As the court cannot enforce any agreement for the application of trade-
union funds in provision of benefits, a receiver cannot be appointed over the
general fund, or funds collected for a special purpose, to prevent their applica-
tion contrary to agreement." KEn, RECEIVERS (9th ed. 1930) 111, 112. It
would seem that the inhibitions of the statute would also extend to the contract
between the membership body and the officers elected by it, infra note 10.
'Russell v. Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners, [1912] A.
C. 421.
10 TRADE UNION AcT oF 1871, §4:
"Nothing in this act shall enable any Court to entertain any legal
proceeding instituted with the object of directly enforcing or recovering
damages for breach of any of the following agreements, namely:
"1. Any agreement between members of a trade union as such,
concerning the conditions on which any members of such trade unions
shall or shall not sell their goods, transact business, employ or be
employed.
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Professor Chaffee is wont to term the "Hot Potato Policy." 11 The
idea being, that no matter what regulation of internal affairs is
made, someone will always be dissatisfied, so the best policy to fol-
low is that of non-interference. That this view has been followed
by the New York courts under the guise of extreme paternalism
has been demonstrated above.1 2
From the last statement it is not to be inferred that the writer is
out of sympathy with all the adjudications of labor, problems in
this state. On the contrary it seems that as a general rule our tri-
bunals have taken a genuinely fatherly attitude toward the work-
ingman.13 Only in a relatively few decisions have the courts adopt-
ed the role of the over-indulgent as distinguished from the cautious
parent.1 4 By appointing receivers for a union, when it is being
fraudulently mismanaged, and there is no possiblity of fair relief
within the organization, the courts are not only setting a splendid
sociological principle but they are also following logically the prece-
dent of the expulsion cases. 15 These opinions laid down the rule
"2. Any agreement for the payment by any person of any subscrip-
tion or penalty to a trade union.
"3. Any agreement for the application of the funds of a trade
union-
"(a) To provide benefits to members; or
"(b) To furnish contributions to any employer or workman not a
member of such trade union, in consideration of such employer
or workman acting in conformity with the rules or restrictions
of such trade union; or
"(c) To discharge any fine imposed upon any person by a court
of justice.
"4. Any agreement made between one trade union or another; or
"5. Any bond to secure the performance of any of the above-
mentioned agreements. But nothing in this section shall be deemed to
constitute any of the above-mentioned agreements unlawful."
For a further discussion of this subject see Geldart, The Status of Trade
Unions in England (1912) 25 HARV. L. REv. 579; also SLEssER AND BLAxE,
THE LAW OF TRADE UNIONS (1921).
' Chaffee, Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit (1930) 43 HARV.
L. REV. 993, 1026.
" The "Hot Potato Policy" seems to be the real reason behind the picketing
cases cited supra note 3.
' National Protective Ass'n v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369
(1902) ; Bossert v. Dhuy, 22T N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917) ; Auburn Dray-
ing Co. v. Wardell, 227 N. Y. 1, 124 N. E. 97 (1919); Stuyvesant Lunch &
Bakery Corp. v. Reiner, 110 Misc. 357, 181 N. Y. Supp. 212 (1920), aff'd, 192
App. Div. 951, 182 N. Y. Supp. 953 (1st Dept. 1920) ; Schwarcz v. International
Ladies Garment Workers' Union, 68 Misc. 528, 124 N. Y. Supp. 968 (1910);
Jaeckel v. Kaufman, 187 N. Y. Supp. 889 (1921); Benito Rovira Co. v. Yam-
polsky, 187 N. Y. Supp. 894 (1921).
" Supra note 3.
" Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N. Y. 277, 177 N. E. 833 (1931); Strauss v.
Thoman, 60 Misc. 72, 111 N. Y. Supp. 745 (1909), aff'd, 129 App. Div. 905,
113 N. Y. Supp. 1148 (lst Dept. 1908) ; Ranken v. Probey, 131 App. Div. 328,
115 N. Y. Supp. 832 (3d Dept. 1909): Grassi Bros. v. O'Rourke, 89 Misc. 234,
153 N. Y. Supp. 493 (1915); Mintz, Trade Union Abuses (1932) 6 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 272, 276-310; Note (1931) 6 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 143.
NOTES AND COMMENT
that: "The constitution and by-laws of an unincorporated associa-
tion express the terms of a contract which define the privileges se-
cured and the duties assumed by those who have become members." 16
Thus it is that equity might, in view of the breach of the contract
by the fraud, intervene to give specific performance. While
such a decree would be open to the objection that it would require
continuous supervision, which is inhibited by a long line of cases,
17
nevertheless, it might well be answered by showing that the courts
have enforced performance of such contracts when an important
public interest or irreparable injury was involved.,' Certainly the
necessity of protecting the working man from unscrupulous exploita-
tion is of supreme interest to the man himself and the country at
large. Although no New York case has gone so far as to appoint
a receiver to enforce a simple agreement, our neighboring state of
New Jersey has indicated that this remedy might be resorted to.19
In that decision no principle of public welfare was invoked. The
appointment was suggested on the ground of irreparable injury.
Equity with conditions similar to those supposedly existing above
would appoint a receiver, for a corporation, whose directors have
breached a fiduciary duty,20 for mortgaged property, when the mort-
gagee has defaulted, 21 and to replace an executor who is acting in
violation of his trust.
22
Those who oppose the contract theory for permitting inter-
vention by the courts into the internal affairs of associations, feel
such an action should be laid in tort.23 Of course, equitable relief
might well be opposed in the case of a mere social club, since a right
of substance would not be involved in a purely non-profit-making.
society of this sort. However, members in a labor group have a
very substantial right to protect. For if the union's affairs are mis-
managed they may find themselves unable to obtain employment.
Thus we see that, whether we predicate the action on the theory of
contract or on that of tort, equity should intervene. The only pos-
sible legal means by which such intervention could be properly ac-
complished is by the appointment of receivers.
"' Polin v. Kaplan, ibid. at 281, 177 N. E. at 836.
17 Marble Co. v. Ripley, 77 U. S. 339 (1870); Beck v. Allison, 56 N. Y.
366 (1874) ; Stanton v. Singelton, 126 Cal. 657, 59 Pac. 146 (1899) ; Blackett v.
Bates, 1 Ch. App. 117 (1865); Wheatley v. Westminister, L. R. 9 Eq.
538 (1869); Powell v. Duffryn Steam Coal Co. v. Taff Vale R. Co., L. R. 9
Ch. App. 331 (1874).
"Prospect Park R. R. Co. v. Coney Island R. R. Co., 144 N. Y. 152, 39
N. E. 17 (1894); St. Regis Paper Co. v. Santa Clara Lumber Co., 173 N. Y.
149, 65 N. E. 967 (1903) ; Lawrence v. Saratoga Lake R. R. Co., 36 Hun 467
(N. Y. 1885).
"' See Curtis Brothers v. Catts, 72 N. J. Eq. 831, 834, 66 Atl. 935, 936
(1907).
Hallenborg v. Greene, 66 App. Div. 590, 53 N. Y. Supp. 403 (1st Dept.
1901); Note (1926) 43 A. L. R. 242.
' See Hollenbeck v. Donnell, 94 N. Y. 342 (1884).
'Jenkins v. Jenkins, 1 Paige 243 (N. Y. 1828).
1 Chaffee, supra note 11, at 1007.
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Yet the Appellate Division set aside the appointment without
a written opinion. However, on oral argument one of the justices
interposed the remark that a receivership would put the court into
the business of running a union.24 We respectfully submit that
this should make no difference. For whenever a court appoints a
receiver it takes over the management of an enterprise. Can it be
that the courts will protect the interests of capital in preventing
the frittering away of assets by fraudulent directors, 25 and yet re-
fuse to protect the interests of the laborer whose representatives
are willing to barter away the union's interest for the sake of pri-
vate gain or factional ascendency. Certainly here is a situation
where equity, the freer of the oppressed, should intervene. Indeed
it is to the greater interest of the country that workingmen's rights
be preserved for "it is only by the labor or workingrhen that states
grow rich.2 6 Regardless of whether it would be within the common
law jurisdiction of equity to grant such relief we think that Section
974 of our Civil Practice Act would give the court the power to
appoint a receiver for the union.2 7
Those who hold that the courts should adopt a "hands-off"
policy think that human element in the individual judge, shaped by
his education and environment, must necessarily have some effect
in his decision in a particular labor dispute brought before him.28
We do not feel that because of the individual prejudices of a fewjudges we should indict our entire judiciary. The writer is in
accord with the view of Professor Kennedy, who, in speaking of
the influence of peculiarly individual traits and prejudices upon thejudicial process, remarks, 29 "However real may be the 'unconscious
" N. Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1933, at 11.
'Supra note 20.
2' Supra note 4.
"N. Y. C. P. A.:
"Sec. 974. Receivers, generally.
"In addition to the cases where the appointment of a receiver is
specially provided for by law, a receiver of property which is the subject
of an action in the Supreme Court or a county court, may be appointed
in either of the following cases:
"1. Before final judgment, on the application of a party who estab-
lishes an apparent right to, or interest in the property, where it is in the
possession of an adverse party and there is danger that it will be removed
beyond the jurisdiction of the court, or lost, materially injured or
destroyed. * * *"
The word "property," as used in this section, includes the rents, profits, or
other income, and the increase, of real or personal property.
' "As in all other fields of human endeavor and thought, the truth is found
at neither the extreme nor in between, but shot through the woof and web of
the fabric. Judicial decision varies with the setting in which it is expected to
operate and the individuals who manipulate the controls. So, clearly, this is not
a government of laws, for there is no unchangeable and unvariable standard
whose objective effect may be thus gauged and dispensed." Rothschild, Men
and Law (1932) 1 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 4-5.
'Kennedy, Men or Law (1932) 2 BROOKLYx L. REv. 11, 21.
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mind,' let us not forget the 'conscious mind' still exists; in this
emphasis upon the dark, one is apt to forget there is such a thing
as light. Lux fiat! The recent eclipse of the sun obscured the rays
of the solar body for a brief period of time. But why argue that
this momentary darkness is a customary or frequent occurrence in
bodies planetary." In other words because; on some rare occasions,
a judge has been swayed by some idee fitee, rather than by prin-
ciples of law, shall we say that all judges will act in a similar
manner. The fallacy is self-evident. There is no more justification
in raising the cry of favoritism in labor adjudications than in any
other controversies, in many of which the judge may have a set
personal opinion. That the courts realize only too well .that their
decisions are not to be swayed either by popular frenzy or private
prejudice is evidenced by the following courageous avowal by our
Court of Appeals: 30
"We are not unmindful of the public interests, of the
insistent hope and need that the ways of bribers and cor-
ruptionists shall be exposed to an indignant world. Com-
manding as those interests are, they do not supply us with
a license to palter with the truth or to twist what has been
written in the statutes into something else that we should
like to see. Historic liberties and privileges are not to bend
from day to day 'because of some accident of immediate
overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and dis-
torts the judgment' (Holmes, J., in Northern Securities Co.
v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 400), are not to change
their form and content in response to the 'hydraulic pres-
sure' (Holmes, J., supra) exerted by great causes. A com-
munity whose judges would be willing to give it whatever
law might gratify the impulse of the moment would find in
the end that it had paid too high a price for relieving itself
of the bother of awaiting a session of the Legislature and
the enactment of a statute in accordance with established
forms."
Is this the declaration of a judiciary that will permit itself to
be swayed by personal opinion?
GEORGE F. L. HENTZ.
RESPECTIVE RIGHTS OF MORTGAGOR AND MORTGAGEE TO INSURANCE
FuNDs.
The case of Savarese et al. v. Ohio Farner's Insurance Co. of
Le Roy, Ohio, et al.' recently decided by the Court of Appeals raised
'Matter of Doyle, 257 N. Y. 244, 268, 177 N. E. 489 (1931).
1260 N. Y. 45, 182 N. E. 665 (1932).
